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ABSTRACT 
The helpful hints herein describe, from a system perspective, the functional flow of hardware and software. The 
flow will begin at the experiment development stage and continue through build-up, test, verification, delivery, 
launch and deintegration of the experiment. An effort will be made to identtfy those interfaces and transfer 
functions of processing that can be improved upon in the new world of “Faster, Better, and Cheaper.” The 
documentation necessary to ensure configuration and processing requirements satisfaction will also be discussed. 
Hints and suggestions for improvements to enhance each phase of the flow will be derived from extensive 
experience and documented lessons learned. Charts will be utilized to define the functional flow and a list of 
“lessons learned will be addressed to show applicability. In conclusion, specific improvements for several areas of 
hardware processing, procedure development and quality assurance, that are generic to all Small Payloads, will be 
identified. 
INTRODUCTION 
The opportunity to test theory in space is often the culmination of many years of research and dedication of this 
nations finest educators, scientists, and research teams. The process from experiment concept through launch and 
mission operations to experiment results is exciting, rewarding, and often overwhelming. This paper is intended 
not only to present to the experimenter the overall scope of the process requirements (Figure 1-2), but more 
importantly to encourage the utilization of the valuable resources available and consider integrating certain 
disciplines within the experiment life-cycle that have been discovered from lessons learned. The lessons learned 
experience base from which this information is derived covers over 130 flight experiments aboard 27 shuttle 
missions. 
THE NASA TECHNICAL MONITOR (NTM) AND LAUNCH SITE SUPPORT MANAGER 
(LSSM) 
The two individuals responsible for ensuring a smooth transition between critical milestones are your NTM and 
LSSM. Following the submission of your Payload Accommodation Requirements (PAR) an NTh4 will be selected 
for your mission. The NTM has the tremendous task of planning and verifying that all of your documentation, 
experiment requirements, support needs and schedules are in place and maintained particularly during the first 
half of the experiment processing effort. Once your experiment reaches the launch site, the LSSM assumes this 
task with direct input and support from the NTM. Their contribution to the success of flight experiments in the 
past is invaluable. To effectively managc the various aspects of preparation, integration, and support, it is crucial 
that you remain in close contact with your NTM. 
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DESIGN PHASE 
Based on Lessons Learned, there are particular aspects of hardware and software design and development that are 
sometimes overlooked. Early consideration of these factors can prevent late-stage work-arounds that are time 
consuming and can dramatically affect the level of integrity of the hardware and/or mission success. 
ReplacementlBack-up PartsIHardware 
During the design and development of your experiment, consider retaining a small stock of critical parts or sub- 
components vital to experiment function that could easily replace failed units. Long-lead or custom items should be 
procured with spares in mind. Ensure that the spares have been tested and are qualified for flight. Remember also 
to bring them with you to the launch-site for contingency use. 
Access to Serviceable Components 
Access to serviceable or system-critical components should be the primary focus in the design of the hardware. The 
location of batteries, cryogen and pressure ports, film transports, data storage units, drive mechanisms, and thermal 
control units, are some of the areas of critical failure that could determine the fate of the experiment if there should 
be a delay in the launch schedule or your experiment fails post-ship functional testing at the launch site. 
Flight Environment VS Test Environment and Vibration & Thermal Effects 
The mission environment can present a host of unforeseen impacts to the proper function of the experiment. 
Obvious considerations include launch-induced vibrations, and hot and coldcase attitudes, which have been 
contributors to numerous experiment failures in the past. The orientation of the experiment during launch can 
cause vibration-induced failures of support structures, component housings, actuators and drive-mechanisms. 
There are additional aspects of the mission cycle that are rarely anticipated. Events such as crew activity onsrbit 
can produce micro-gravity upsets that may affect the processing of materials. The experiment may be affected by 
virtue of its location relative to co-manifested payloads. Thermal extremes may occur as a result of shadowing from 
larger payloads. Unusual occurrences which have affected previous experiments include the South Atlantic 
Anomaly which can interrupt and/or corrupt critical data and telemetry functions. While not all impacts can be 
foreseen, giving thoughtful consideration to certain extremes may provide you with the opportunity to incorporate 
certain safe-guards within your design to protect your experiment from such events. 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Operating Parameters 
A vital component of experiment function is the integrity of the GSE. Having a thorough understanding of its 
electrical or mechanical influence on the experiment can reduce or eliminate your support hardware as a 
contributor in hard failures or unexplained anomalies in testing. A primary performance function of electrical GSE 
is accurate signal generation. Grounding schemes within the support equipment and flight experiment can 
significantly affect signal quality. Troubleshooting efforts during previous launch site processing operations 
ultimately resulted in signal spikes, or timing incompatibilities produced by the Electrical Ground Support 
Equipment (EGSE). 
Limited Life Items 
When selecting certain items for your experiment, determine the survivability of that item under conditions such as 
the time-lag between final installation and the end of mission. Under normal circumstances, that duration could 
last as long as 3 months depending upon your installation date of that item. O-rings, valves, seals, film, lubricants, 
etc. could suffer severe degradation or ultimate failure if installed too soon or schedule slips force a launch delay. 
WeightNolume Limitations 
Keep in mind the importance of maintaining your estimated payload weight. The experiment directly affects the 
overall weight and Center of Gravity (CG) of the carrier and could violate requirements established in the 
Interface Control DocumentAnformation Requirements Document (ICDARD) which constrain both the carrier and 
launch vehicle. The volume of your experiment must also remain within the requirements established by your 
carrier hardware. Design modifications may contribute to both weight and volume exceedances. 
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On-Orbit Input Requirements 
During the design stage of your experiment development, be aware of the extent of maintenance or operational 
processes that would be required during the mission to ensure proper function and health of your experiment. It 
may be possible for you to incorporate “self-check and correct’’ features within your system that would 
automatically provide protection to your experiment without the assistance of the flight or ground crews. 
Experiment Structural Support 
When designing the experiment support structure it is imperative to verify that it can withstand launch-induced 
vibration and shock loads in their respective orientations. A vertical support strut will be horizontal at launch and 
must withstand launch-mode effects without compromise in this orientation. 
Drawings/Historical Traceability 
There is no substitute for documentation that accurately reflects the confguration and history of experiment 
performance, specifically when an anomaly occurs. During off-line processing it’s an invaluable tool for assisting 
in troubleshooting, oftentimes reducing the extent of tear-down to reveal the source of a failure. But more so, it is a 
tremendous time-saver in that historical performance patterns often reflected in the data are ordinarily impossible 
to detect through troubleshooting efforts. Traceability of testing results and conftguration also becomes more 
valuable as your experiment moves through the integration processes with the camer and ultimately to the launch 
vehicle. On-line experiment failures involve numerous organizations including co-manifested payload 
organizations, flow managers and directors, and other NASA centers responsible for mission operations or orbiter 
integrity. Being able to provide or access accurate and complete data of your experiment will not only expedite the 
troubleshooting effort for the launch site community but also produce a level of confidence within that community 
that the experiment integrity has been maintained through a tracking discipline. 
Payload Integration Plan (PIP) and Interface Control Document (ICD) Input 
The top-level controlling documents for shuttle payloads are the PIP and the ICD. Requiremeats unique to your 
experiment should be provided to your NTM for consideration and/or incorporation into these top level documents. 
Special servicing, handling, monitoring, and accessing requirements will be addressed and an implementation 
approach developed within the constraints of these documents. 
EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT & TEST PHASE 
The integrity of the experiment resides in the workmanship afforded it, the level of testing performed, and the 
strict control of configuration. 
Ensure As-Built Compliance to PAR, Drawings and Safety Package 
The largest contributor to the loss of flight-worthy configuration is design modifications. Most changes are likely 
to occur during the experiment development phase. Ordinarily by this time the PAR has been established and 
understood, the preliminary design has been issued, and build-up efforts are underway in the development of the 
final safety data package. As design changes occur it is imperative that they be evaluated against the requirements 
documents to ensure that the experiment remains within the specified limits of acceptability for flight. 
Materials (Compatibility, Acceptability) 
When selecting materials both for flight and ground support use, special attention should be given to the following 
situations. Several regulating documents exist that control the level of incompatibility and hazard of materials used 
for space flight. However, there are instances when materials used independently or combined within your 
experiment may produce unfavorable conditions for sensitive instruments and systems. Venfy that the location, 
containment and compatibility of your materials will not adversely S e c t  your experiment or the carrier hardware 
both in ambient and flight environments. Another area of caution when utilizing materials is during on-line 
operations. Materials used for lens covers, support structures, transport containers, etc., must also meet the 
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stringent cleanliness requirements imposed on flight hardware. Off-gassing fluids and materials that are 
incompatible with the orbiter or co-manifested payloads will be prohibited. In preparing your ground support 
equipment and remove-before-flight items, keep in mind the environment in which that it will be used. You may 
find yourself being denied access to your experiment until your support equipment is bagged, cleaned, 
encapsulated, or any number of time-consuming corrections are made. 
Payload Orientation Effects During Launch Processing 
Fluid distribution and containment systems, batteries, low-viscosity materials, etc., must withstand a 90 degree 
change in orientation from the payload vertical axis following installation into the orbiter. It will remain in that 
orientation until a successful launch is achieved. Nominally the time of orbiter rotation to launch is approximately 
5 weeks. However, launch delays and in rare cases orbiter roll-back could extend that duration up to 2 months or 
longer. 
Detailed Test ObjectivedDetailed Science Objectives @TO/DSO) 
Definitive test objectives should be established during the development and test phase for incorporation into 
launch-site procedures. A clear go/no-go criteria for experiment performance will eliminate the need to interpret 
performance data real-time and aid in defining success and failure criteria during carrier and launch vehicle 
testing. 
CARRIER INTEGRATION & TEST PHASE AT GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
(GSFC) 
SimulateNerify Flight Configuration of Hardware and. Software 
Once your experiment has reached this stage, there will be a noticeable acceleration of the schedule toward launch. 
Now is the time to simulate complete command and control capability and verify integrated systems compatibility. 
An interface verification test will be performed validating system integrity. Within that process, the s o h a r e  
utilized at this phase of your experiment testing should also result in the final version for flight. 
Perform Fit Checks 
Non-standard interfaces should be verified through fit checks. Conditions such as the build-up of tolerances can 
ultimately result in the improper fit, form or function upon final integration. 
Procedure Development 
As the experiment moves into the carrier integration phase of the launch flow, there should be a verification 
process by which to ensure that experiment unique requirements such as special handling, ESD precautions, or 
other restrictions are addressed correctly within the working documentation. Involvement in the review process is 
highly encouraged and could prevent an inadvertent oversight by support personnel who are less familiar with your 
particular experiment. 
ExperimentlCarrier Interface Verification Test (TVT) 
The experimentlcarrier IVT is the most critical phase of pre-flight processing. This is the stage of the flow that 
offers a sufficient margin within the schedule and resource limitations of processing for discovering and recovering 
from any system failures. It is also the final opportunity to sufficiently test your experiment and its crucial 
interface with the carrier. Once this phase of testing has been accomplished, there should be few, if any, 
unexpected “occurrences” following shipment to the launch site. 
CARRIER INTEGRATION & TEST PHASE AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (KSC) 
Access to Launch-Site Facilities 
The Launch Site Support Plan (LSSP) is a baseline document that is customized for each mission incorporating 
inputs provided by your NTM and the LSSM. It is a valuable guide to the processing environment at the launch 
site and covers requirements for such things as training, security, support, and safety. 
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Launch-Site Support Capabilitiesnimitations 
In preparation for launch-site processing the experiment should be at or near flight configuration. However, post- 
ship functional and integration activities may warrant minor adjustments and securing for final integration into the 
orbiter. It is best to assume that materials and equipment that you may require will be difficult to provide. So if at 
all possible add them to your shipment of GSE. In the event of an experiment failure in the field, real-time support 
for equipment and supplies has been provided in the past, but is difficult to arrange in short notice, so plan for 
contingencies. 
Impact/Affect of External Operations 
Inform your NTM of experiment sensitivities early. Following payload installation into the orbiter, literally 
hundreds of separate and distinct operations will occur in preparing the orbiter for flight. Generally the payloads 
are protected from orbiter activity, but there are instances when routine operations have been a cause of concern for 
experiments within the cargo bay. Operations such as main engine x-rays at the launch pad generated an 
experimenter request to install a lead blanket between his flight hardware and the aft bulkhead of the orbiter. Co- 
manifested payloads conducting pre-flight operations may also inadvertently affect your experiment. These issues 
are ordinarily discussed and agreed upon early in the ground operations planning meetings, but it is always 
advisable to clarify instrument sensitivities. 
InstrumentKarrier Testing With Simulated Orbiter Power/Signal 
It is crucial to establish an accurate test simulation of the orbiter supplied power and signal generation to verify 
complete system compatibility. This would include video cabling and monitor or other unique interfaces that will 
be utilized during the mission. 
Maintain Configuration 
Once the experimentkarrier testing has been accomplished at GSFC, maintain configuration of both flight 
hardware and GSE. Annoying subtleties between duplicate equipment can cause deviations in the expected results 
and this can easily be avoided through diligent control of the validated system. This would also include your 
validated software version. 
Procedures Hazardous VS Non-Hazardous 
Keep in mind that the later in the processing flow that operations are deferred the more difficult they are to get 
approved. Personnel safety constraints are a large part of the difficulty in requesting late-stage operations. There 
are firm and heavily enforced requirements in place at the launch-site regarding hazardous operations. The long- 
pole of the process is obtaining procedure approval which stands at a 45-day minimum prior to first use. Hazardous 
operations are clearly defined in the KHl3 1700.7 and it is recommended that the experimenter familiarize himself 
with the differentiation between hazardous and non-hazardous operations. 
Contingency Landing Site (CLS), Launch Delay/Slip 
Within the realm of possibilities is post-mission landing at an alternate site. Special thought must be given to the 
precautionary measures to be taken in stabilizing your experiment, if applicable, and whether equipment andor 
support personnel would be required to perform safhg operations upon landing. 
Launch delays are not uncommon. Any number of factors can prevent the shuttle from an on-time launch. Under 
this condition, your experiment should be able to sustain relatively minor delays without special consideration. 
However, in the eventuality that the delay has slipped the launch to several days or even weeks, it may be necessary 
for you to access or service your experiment. Prepare for the eventuality of late-breaking changes. They are, in 
more moderate doses, a commonality in this business. 
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ORBITER INTEGRATION & TEST PHASE 
Interface Verification Test (IVT) 
The final system validation occurs with orbiter power and signal following payload installation. This is the final 
test- 
hurdle that will verify full-up integrity for mission success. It is also when problems can occur if there was not 
sufficient testing of the experiment and carrier during off-line Operations. 
Remove-Before-Flight Items 
When designing instrument covers, be advised that the removal operations ordinarily occur following installation 
into the orbiter and therefore requires all tools and equipment to be tethered upon installation or removal from the 
cargo bay. Designing in a simple handle or eye-let through which a tether could be secured prevents make-shift 
rigging that may compromise the success of the removal operations. 
Payload Stand-Alone Operations 
Stand-alone operations is a term given to payload autonomous activity once “on-line”. As private and comforting 
as that may sound, it is far from either. Any operations occurring within the orbiter are highly visible, carefully 
monitored, and generally cumbersome particularly when access support such as buckets or platforms are required. 
Payload Documentation Closure 
It is advisable that prior to launch the experimenter ensure that all discrepancies, failures and action items have 
been adequately addressed and/or resolved. A brief documentation review provides an additional level of assurance 
that nothing has been overlooked. It is not uncommon to become consumed in pre-flight operations to the extent of 
losing sight of some of the details. Through comprehensive planning efforts and periodic checks of hardware, 
software and documentation status’ your attention can stay focused on the more rewarding aspects of flight 
processing, specifically your experiment. 
POST-FLIGHT DEINTEGRATION PHASE 
Post-Flight Payload Access 
Generally, payload removal from the orbiter occurs a week after orbiter arrival. At that time, depending on the 
carrier, your experiment may be available to you within the following week. Under certain circumstances, it may be 
possible to perform an initial visual inspection of the flight hardware shortly after cargo bay doors are opened. This 
is ordinarily an option if anomalous conditions are suspected. 
Safing Requirements 
Depending on the complexity of your experiment, there may or may not be a requirement to perform d i n g  
operations post-landing. This is generally reserved for payloads carrying ordinance, or require flight battery circuit 
deactivation. If your experiment requires early access, be sure to negotiate options early in your agreement 
planning phase. 
Shipping and Storage Details 
The concern in packaging for shipment is with hazardous materials. Items that are flammable, corrosive, or toxic, 
radiation’or ignition sources, or other commodities that require protective handling must be packaged and labeled 
correctly for shipment. They must also be utilized in compliance with KSC Safety, Health Physics and 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations while at the launch site. Be aware of what 
qualifies as a hazardous material and the restrictions over their use. This data is available from your LSSM. 
Data Retrieval and Integrity Maintenance 
As important as it is to have developed a flight-worthy experiment that successfully completes its mission, it is 
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equally important that the experiment results are protected properly after flight. Too often in the rush of accessing 
mission results, there is a tendency to forgo precautionary measures in the handling, tear-down, shipping, or 
storage process that can degrade or destroy critical experiment results. Define your protective requirements pnor to 
the launch. Someone else may have the responsibility to deintegrate your payload and ship your data/GSE. 
CONCLUSION 
A successful processing effort can be achieved by maintaining control of the hardware, software, and GSE 
configuration, ensuring compliance to flight and processing requirements, and communicating regularly with the 
NTM. Items for consideration in formulating processing objectives are summarized for use by the experimenter in 
Figure 3. The degree of attention provided in each phase of experiment processing builds upon and proportionately 
translates into a smoother interface and transfer effort. It is evidenced through the lessons learned that when sound 
processing discipline is installed there is a marked improvement in experiment performance and mission results. 
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Helpful Hints for Experimenters 
DESIGN DEVELOPMENT & TEST I CARRIER I & T (GSFC) 
4 Replacementback-up parWhardwsre 
4 Access to Serviceable Components 
4 Flight VS Test Environment 
4 GSE Operating Parameters 
4 Limited Life Items 
4 WeighWolune Limitations 
4 M t i o n  8 Thermal Effects 
4 On-Orbit Input Requirements 
4 Experiment Power, Heat, Data, etc. 
4 Carrier Mounting Interfaces 
4 BatterySelection 
6 Exwriment Structural Swwrt  
+ Access to Launch-Site Facilities 
4 Launch-Site Support Capabilities/ 
4 ImpacVAffect of External Operations 
+ InslrumenVCarrier Testing With 
Simulated Orbiter Power/Signal + Maintain Configuration 
+ Remove-Before-Flight Items 
+ External Impacts: Temperature, 
Limitations Humidity. Welding, X-Rays. etc. 
+ Payload Servicing 
4 Payload Accmodation Requirements 
4 FliitReservation 
+ Launch Services Apeement (LSA) 
4 HazardAssessment 
+ Hazard Control VerifKation 
+ Preliiinary Safety Data Package 
+ Final Safety Data Package 
+ Flightcertification 
4 PlPllCD lnwt 
4 Post-Flight Payload Access 
4 Safing Requirements 
4 Shipping and Storage Details 
4 Data Retrieval 8 lntegity Maintenance 
P L A N  N l  N G  
4 Understand Operating Parameters of 
Purchased Components 
+ Ensure As-Built Cwnpliance to PAR, 
Drawings 8 Safety Data Package 
+ Materials(Compatability.Acceptability) 
+ Payload Orientation Effects During 
Launch Processing 
+ Procedures Hazsrdous VS Non 
+ EEOM,TAL,DFRF,Launch DelaylSlip 
+ Payload StanMJone Operations 
+ Payload Documentation Closure 
+ Contingency in Schedule for 
ProblemJFailtres 
+ Payload Special Handling Instructions 
4 Shipper Including Special Instructions 
D O C U M E N T A T I O N  
4 Complete Safety Data Package 
4 Materials (MUA, Shipping. MSDS) 
4 DTOIDSO 
4 As-Built Verification For 
Phase 3 Safety 
+ LSAAddendum 
+ Input to PIP Annexes 
4 ExperimentCarrierIVT 
CARRIER I & T (KSC) ! ORBITER I & T IPOST-FLIGHT DEINTEGRATIONI 
Fiaure .,. 3. 
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